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Abstract 
 
 IoT systems have enabled ubiquitous 
communication in physical spaces, making them smart 
Nowadays, there is an emerging concern about 
evaluating suspicious transactions in smart spaces. 
Suspicious transactions might have a logical structure, 
but they are not correct under the present contextual 
information of smart spaces. This research reviews 
suspicious transactions in smart spaces and evaluates 
the characteristics of blockchain technology to manage 
them. Additionally, this research presents a 
blockchain-based system model with the novel idea of 
iContracts (interactive contracts) to enable contextual 
evaluation through proof-of-provenance to detect 
suspicious transactions in smart spaces. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
According to Zhang et al. [1], physical spaces 
become smart when its technological elements can 
communicate between them and with the Internet to 
enhance the physical features of that particular space 
and satisfy the requirements of multiple users (Internet 
of Things multitenancy [2]).  
Smart spaces rely on pervasive Internet of Things 
(IoT) systems [3][4] to get data from the environment 
and provide accurate services [5]. The more 
pervasiveness, the more autonomous smart spaces 
become and the more personalized services multiple 
users receive [6]. According to Zhang et al. [1], IoT 
systems that govern smart spaces “must be context-
aware so that they can adapt to rapidly changing 
conditions.” However, most of the IoT systems do not 
evaluate contextual information before executing 
transactions, which makes IoT networks vulnerable to 
attacks, — for instance,  the implantable cardiac 
devices from St. Jude Hospital that were hacked [7].   
This research evaluates the characteristics of 
blockchain technology to handle the emerging concern 
of evaluating suspicious transactions in smart spaces. 
Additionally, this research presents a system model to 
help to identify suspicious transactions in smart spaces 
by evaluating contextual information and proof of 
provenance. This system model introduces iContracts 
(interactive contracts). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents smart spaces, their architectures and 
security concerns. Section 3 introduces suspicious 
transactions in smart spaces. Section 4 introduces 
blockchain for smart spaces. Section 5 explains the 
proposed system model. Section 6 presents preliminary 
evaluations. Finally, section 7 presents conclusions and 
future work. 
 
2. Smart Spaces 
 
According to Baladin and Waris [8], smart spaces 
are common spaces that have capabilities to get data 
from the environment and apply knowledge to fulfill 
requirements of mobility, distribution and context 
awareness of its inhabitants, without them to be 
required to do any particular task.  
The advent of Internet of Things (IoT) technology 
has allowed the development of ubiquitous smart 
spaces [9][10], which include devices with 
heterogeneous computing capabilities [11], processing 
power, memory and communication protocols to 
satisfy those requirements. 
The design of smart spaces is dictated by their 
mission, location and specific requirements for 
inhabitants [8]. Traditionally, architectures for IoT 
smart spaces integrate the Cloud as the provider of 
virtually unlimited computing resources to process the 
vast amounts of sensed data and manage the connected 
devices to satisfy a possible scaling demand [12][13]. 
This architecture is mostly used in healthcare; for 
instance, Doukas et al. [14] combine IoT and Cloud 
computing to manage wearable sensors. Also, Tyagi et 
al. [15] present and IoT-cloud framework to manage 
the transferal of patients’ health information. Cloud-
based smart spaces have to deal with security, latency 
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 and traffic caused by the communication, data 
processing, and access control management of the 
volume and velocity of data obtained from different 
geographical locations [13][16][17]. Sometimes, 
cloud-based smart spaces lack of security at the 
constrained level of sensors and actuators. This issue is 
mainly because cloud-based systems do not interact 
with IoT networks directly but through a middleware 
[12]. This lack of security at the constrained level is the 
perfect opportunity for hackers to penetrate our smart 
spaces (e.g., [7][18][19][20]). 
Researchers have presented an alternative 
architecture to interact with IoT networks directly, 
which switch the focus to devices [21]. This 
architecture focuses on the enhancement of sensors and 
actuators, providing computing resources closer to 
them. This approach lowers latency and traffic in 
communication, data processing, and access control 
management — for instance, enchanted objects 
customized for specific users [22]. Things-centric 
smart spaces have to deal with emerging security 
issues regarding communication, data processing, and 
access control management at the constrained level 
where services directly access physical devices [16]. 
For instance, multitenancy and edge processing 
[23][2][24].   
 
3. Suspicious Transactions in IoT Smart 
Spaces 
 
Based on the generally accepted architecture of IoT 
networks [25][22], suspicious transactions can be 
studied from two perspectives, cloud-centric and 
things-centric. 
The cloud-centric [25] perspective focuses on 
analyzing communication, data processing, and access 
control management transactions from services hosted 
on the Cloud. 
The things-centric [22] perspective focuses on 
analyzing communication, data processing, and access 
control management transactions in the constrained 
network and edges. Things-centric suspicious 
transactions might affect the correct functionality of 
sensors and actuators, and edge devices that work as 
bridges.  
Table 1 presents a comparative analysis of 
suspicious transactions in the Cloud and constrained 
networks.
 
 
Table 1: Comparative Analysis of Suspicious Transactions in Smart Spaces  
 Cloud-Centric Things-Centric 
Communication - Execution of not registered 
communication protocols 
- Delayed data streaming from sensors and edge 
devices 
 
Data Processing 
- High latency when processing 
sensed data on Internet services 
- High latency when processing sensed data on 
edge services hosted at the edge of sensors (e.g. 
raspberry pi) 
 
 
 
Access Control 
Management 
- Failure of Internet services 
authentication 
- No authentication or a global 
authentication requirement for third 
parties reading sensed data 
- Distribution of incorrect views for 
users 
- Execution of unauthorized online 
financial transactions 
 
- Failure of sensors or actuators authentication 
- Not authentication or a global authentication 
requirement for third parties executing 
firmware updates 
- Distribution of incorrect firmware to devices. 
- Execution of unauthorized operations among 
actuators 
 
 
 
 
In any case, suspicious transactions have to be detected 
and stopped to avoid compromising the integrity of our 
smart spaces. According to Lee et al. [26], the 
contextual scenario in which smart spaces work and 
data is processed is an emerging security concern.  
 
 
 
Additionally, Perera et al. [27] explain that smart 
spaces should consider surrounding contextual 
information to guarantee security in rapidly-changing 
environments. Conceptual and physical conditions can 
drive this change. The current contextual details of a 
smart space can determine whether or not a transaction 
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 should be considered as suspicious [28][29]. 
Contextual parameters might include real-time 
environment data, history data, rules, among others, 
depending on the application field of the smart space. 
The following are examples of context-aware IoT 
systems. Smailagic and Kogan [30] present a location 
context-aware IoT environment for location sensing, 
which uses less power and achieves secure privacy. 
Additionally, Al-Muhtadi et al. [31] present a security 
scheme that implements a context-aware infrastructure 
to manage the identification of users and access control 
to physical resources. 
 
4. Blockchain & Smart Spaces 
 
Autonomy and personalization of smart spaces 
come to the price of giving private data to centralized 
systems. Smart spaces commonly manage 
communication, data processing, and access to data 
through centralized architectures in the cloud. While 
this approach provides high consistency (CAP theorem 
[32]), it introduces a security concern as all data and 
access to data is managed by a unique central 
authority.  
Researchers have integrated blockchain 
technologies in smart spaces [3][4] to avoid 
centralization of data. Thus, communication, data 
processing, and access control management are 
executed in a distributed approach with high security, 
reliability, and immutability by blockchain smart 
contracts without granting all decision power to a 
single authority  [33][34][35].  
Even though the immutability of blockchain smart 
contracts introduces high security and reliability, they 
might represent a downside when considering security 
concerns related to rapidly changing contextual 
information [29][36][37]. Blockchain-based systems 
have been implemented mostly to manage access 
control management through smart contracts 
[38][39][40]. There is still research to do to evaluate 
blockchain working on rapidly changing environments 
like smart spaces. It is necessary to build blockchain-
based systems that integrate software components to 
manage rapidly changing contextual information 
[41][42]. These types of systems would be especially 
useful nowadays that we are surrounded by IoT 
devices whose security proxy relies on single keys and 
passwords. Sometimes, we detect intrusions when it 
has passed a long time, and our smart space has been 
compromised. 
This research proposes a model that supports 
blockchain systems by enabling context-awareness and 
flexibility to detect suspicious transactions under 
changing contextual information in smart spaces. 
 
5. Proposed System Model 
 
We propose a system model that integrates 
blockchain technology to provide decentralization, 
high security and reliability of transactions. 
Additionally, our system model integrates external 
components to deal with rapidly changing contextual 
information. We call these external components 
iContracts (interactive contracts). Unlike traditional 
blockchain smart contracts, iContracts can be updated 
at any time, which enables high flexibility that 
blockchain technologies do not have. 
The proposed system model has three components, 
a private blockchain system to mine transactions, 
iContracts to evaluate contextual information, and a 
Transaction Executor to execute transactions over IoT 
devices. iContracts and Transaction Executor have 
been designed as REST services, each of them with 
different URI’s as the unique ID. iContracts read 
information from the private blockchain system 
through REST microservices implemented with HTTP 
protocol. iContracts and the Transaction Executor 
communicate between them through REST APIs 
implemented with CoAP protocol [43]. The 
programming language to develop REST 
microservices, iContracts and Transaction Executor is 
GoLang [44]. 
 
5.1. Blockchain System 
 
The blockchain system is the main entry point of 
the model; it mines all received transactions and passes 
them to iContracts. The blockchain system is 
configured as a consortium network to mine 
transactions through a proof-of-work mechanism. Even 
though the blockchain network is not public, we 
consider that the proof-of-work mechanism is 
necessary to allow the participation of external miners. 
The blockchain system exposes reading and writing 
operation through REST API’s.   
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Figure 1. The general architecture of the proposed system model. 
 
 
 
 
5.2. iContracts (Interactive Contracts) 
 
iContracts have three levels of abstractions, 
iContracts factory, iContracts evaluators, and 
iContracts verifiers. iContracts factory build the 
contextual information, which is represented by the 
provenance of transactions of IoT devices read from 
the blockchain and by the surrounding data got by 
sensors. iContracts factory builds the skeleton that will 
allow iContracts evaluators to determine possible 
suspicious transactions. iContracts factory has the 
following components: 
• Internal URL to receive transactions from the 
blockchain system, and to interact with other 
iContracts.  
• Conceptual information, the provenance of 
transactions obtained from the blockchain system. 
• Physical Information, surrounding environment 
data obtained from sensors (e.g. date, temperature, 
location, among others). 
 
iContracts evaluators encapsulate a set of rules and 
policies designed as REST services to evaluate 
contextual information (conceptual and physical  
 
 
information about transactions and IoT devices, 
respectively) received from iContracts factory. Rules 
are implemented in the form of If-Else structures, and 
policies are implemented in the form of triggered 
actions.  If an iContract evaluator detects that a 
transaction is trying to be executed under and old 
contextual template or a completely different one, they 
will consider those transactions as suspicious and stop 
them. iContracts evaluators mark transactions as 
suspicious or approved. Approved transactions are sent 
to the Transaction Executor, and suspicious 
transactions are sent to iContracts verifiers.  iContracts 
evaluators have the following components: 
• Internal URL to receive contextual information 
from iContracts factory and interact with other 
iContracts.  
• Context-awareness Code, rules/conditions/policies 
to evaluate contextual information.  
 
iContracts verifiers encapsulate a 2-phase 
verification process which requires the revoke/approval 
of users from a trusted device (push notification). All 
suspicious transactions will be stopped until receiving 
the commit from the user. iContracts will change the 
state of suspicious transactions that were accepted by 
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the user to approved and will pass them to the IoT 
transaction executor. Rejected transactions will be part 
of the provenance information and will be included in 
the next round of received mined transactions in 
iContracts factory.  
iContracts can be updated to fulfill the new 
contextual validation requirements of users.  The 
update of iContracts must be executed by trusted nodes 
and additionally requires an extra 2-phase commit 
validation. 
 
5.3. Transaction Executor 
 
The transaction executor is the component that 
finally executes transactions onto physical IoT devices. 
Only mined transactions that have passed the 
validation process from iContracts will reach this 
component. This approach decreases internal latency, 
which introduces a better performance compared to 
Cloud-centric IoT [45]. 
 
6. Preliminary Evaluations  
 
Preliminary evaluations were performed to measure 
the performance of the two components that support 
contextual evaluation in smart spaces, iContracts 
(factory and evaluators). iContracts verifiers could not 
be evaluated as they depend on the commit action from 
users. Table 2 presents the characteristic of the nodes 
that run the iContracts. 
We used Ethereum [46] to implement the private 
blockchain network. Table 2 presents the characteristic 
of the nodes that run the Ethereum network. 
 
Table 2. Specification of the nodes that run the 
Ethereum blockchain network and execute iContracts 
Hardware Details 
Operating System Linux Debian 9.8 
CPU Intel(R) Core (TM) i7-6700 CPU @ 3.40GHz 
RAM 16 GB 
 
 
We emulated IoT temperature sensors as Golang 
routines deployed on Edison Arduino boards (figure 2). 
Table 3 shows the specifications of the hardware. We 
emulated provenance of transactions (everyday 
transactions) that includes only reading transactions 
over IoT devices. The reading operations involve 
sensing the current temperature in Celsius, and the 
updated configuration is intended to change it to 
Fahrenheit.  The new transaction to be executed is the 
updating of the configuration to perform those reading 
operations.  
 
 
Figure 2. Intel Edison System on a Chip plugged on an 
Arduino Board [47] 
 
Table 3. Specifications of Edison SoC [47] 
Edison System on a Chip 
Operating 
System 
Linux Yocto 
CPU 500 MHz dual-core, dual threaded Intel Atom 
and a 100 MHz 32-bit Intel Quark 
microcontroller 
RAM 4GB LPDDR2 SDRAM 
 
 
To have information for the iContract factory to 
build the contextual scenario, we sent 100 reading 
transactions. After that, we sent the suspicious 
transaction (configuration updating) randomly. As 
soon as the proof of provenance of the iContract 
evaluator detects a transaction that has not been 
executed before, they mark the transaction as 
suspicious and send it to get the user approval or 
rejection. 
Figures 3 to 5 show the performance of the 
iContract factory while collecting the contextual 
information under different delays of transaction 
requests (50, 100, and 200 milliseconds). The 
contextual information includes the provenance 
information of the 100 transactions divided into groups 
of 10 and current date time as the physical information. 
In the graphs, the x-axis represents every provenance 
input group, and the y-axis represents the time it takes 
to the iContract factory to build all the contextual 
information.  The figure shows that it takes around 2 
seconds to collect the conceptual and physical 
contextual information. This performance result is 
directly linked to the number of previously sent 
transactions (100). It is necessary to perform more 
experiments to determine if the size of the provenance 
data affects the performance of the iContract factory. 
 
The delay in requesting transactions does not affect 
the performance of the context factory. 
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Figure 3. Performance of the iContract factory. 50 
milliseconds delay. 
 
 
Figure 4. Performance of the iContract factory. 100 
milliseconds delay. 
 
 
Figure 5. Performance of the iContract factory. 200 
milliseconds delay. 
 
Figures 6 to 8 show the performance of the 
iContract evaluator reading contextual information 
received from the iContract factory. The results show 
that in all three scenarios, the response pattern is 
similar. The iContract evaluator take less than one 
millisecond to read each contextual input. In average it 
takes 0.33 milliseconds in all three scenarios. The 
response times are that low because the iContract 
evaluator reads every contextual data individually.  
 
Figure 6. Performance of iContract evaluator reading 
contextual information. 50 milliseconds delay. 
 
 
Figure 7. Performance of iContract evaluator reading 
contextual information. 100 milliseconds delay. 
 
 
Figure 8. Performance of iContract evaluator reading 
contextual information. 200 milliseconds delay. 
 
Figures 9 to 11 show the performance of the 
iContract evaluator analyzing contextual information; 
this is comparing the provenance and physical data of 
all 100 contextual inputs. The graph shows that it takes 
less than 1 second to execute rules and policies 
contained in the iContract evaluator for each contextual 
data. This response is because the iContract evaluator 
works locally. The graphs show some picks. This is 
because the suspicious transaction is sent randomly, 
and every time it is detected; then the 2-phase context 
verification is activated.  
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Figure 9. Performance of the iContract evaluator analyzing 
contextual information. 50 milliseconds delay. 
 
 
Figure 10. Performance of the iContract evaluator analyzing 
contextual information. 100 milliseconds delay. 
 
 
Figure 11. Performance of the iContract evaluator analyzing 
contextual information. 200 milliseconds delay. 
 
The main goal of this research is to introduce a 
system that helps to detect the emerging security issue 
regarding context-awareness and suspicious 
transactions in smart spaces.  
The scope of these experiments does not include 
the evaluation of the transaction executor and the 
blockchain system because some research works 
already evaluate those areas [48][49][50]. 
 For this preliminary evaluation, the iContract 
verification was designed as a web component, but it 
can be designed as a mobile component as well. This 
preliminary evaluation is limited by the number of 
emulated temperature sensors and the frequency of 
execution of suspicious transactions. As this is an 
initial state of the integration of context-aware systems 
to evaluate suspicious transactions in smart spaces, we 
have considered that this preliminary evaluation would 
allow us to get a general vision about how our 
proposed system behaves in a basic  environment. 
However, more details about contextual information 
and evaluations will be presented in subsequent 
research work that integrates extensive experiments 
environments. 
 
7.  Conclusions and Future Work  
 
This research presents the novel idea of designing a 
system model to detect suspicious transactions in smart 
spaces. This model introduces iContracts (interactive 
contracts), which are software components that 
encapsulate information of IoT devices, the provenance 
of executed transactions, rules and policies to evaluate 
contextual information and suspicious transactions.  
 The proposed system model combines blockchain 
technology with iContracts to enhance security at the 
constrained level and handle the rapid changing 
contextual information of smart spaces. 
Results of presented experiments may vary due to 
differences in IoT devices, programming languages, 
communication protocols, or definitions of different 
rules/policies in iContracts. As future work, more 
experiments will be performed to evaluate smart spaces 
facing different contextual information and working on 
large test environments. 
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